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 We develop a model to explain the relationship between mixed electoral system and 
democracy sustained through cohabitation. This model takes in account nascent 
democracy as foreign imposed democracy countries. We find a strong relation between 
mixed electoral system and likelihood of cohabitation through analysis of Palestinian 
legislative election in 2006. This relation reflects the impact of both factors, 
Independent candidates, and polarization to big parties. The model suggests that if 
sustainability democracy tends to survive, more effort should be taken in this field, such 
as, changing institutional factors, reducing presidential power, reducing threatening of 
occupation, and improving consocialism condition.  
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 The Palestinian political system has been 
established recently after Oslo agreement between 
Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO) and Israeli 
occupied government in 1993. By this agreement, 
Palestinian Authority (PA) has been founded as local 
authority in some parts of West bank and Gaza strip 
(A areas) under Israeli military existence. According 
to Oslo agreement, PA must held election in 
presidential and legislative level; that is why; 
Palestinian democracy is considered as foreign 
imposed democracy, as the occupied authority is still 
the main and strong player in Palestinian political 
arena. (Lopes, 2008) 
 Since 1993 until now, two Legislative elections 
were held in Palestinian territories; the first election 
was in 1996, held without participation from mostly 
opposition parties, including Hamas, they refused 
Oslo agreement, so Fateh, the big authority party, 
was elected easily. The second one was held in 2006, 
when Mr Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was the 
president of PA; most of Palestinian opposing parties 
including Hamas, participated in this election. The 
result for 2006 election was surprising; Hamas won 
majority seats of Palestinian legislative council, 
while Abu Mazen, chief of Fateh party was ruling as 
a president. In this semi-presidential political system, 
cohabitation had been occurred, led to gridlock and 
conflict between the president- from Fateh- and 
priminister –From Hamas-(Cavatorta and Elgie, 
2009). The final result for responsibilities struggle 
was internal war and division between Gaza and 
West bank, which led to democracy collapse after 
one year and had second Palestinian legislative 
election in 2006 (Shikaki, 2002). In this research, we 
assume that Palestinian cohabitation occurred 
because of polarization of votes towards Hamas (less 
electoral fractionalization) is bigger than Fateh. That 
polarization depends on Palestinian divided society 
according to position regarding occupation. 
According to that, this research investigates the 
relation between mixed electoral system and 
cohabitation in Palestine case as occupied country. 
Understanding this relation will contribute in solving 
the problem of Palestinian democracy collapse as an 
expected reason for cohabitation status. 
 Palestinian is confused about the suitable 
electoral system for their nascent democracy; the first 
election was held in 1996 under majority election 
system (First Past The Post), but in the next election, 
this was changed after Cairo meeting in 2005, 
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between Palestinian parties including Fateh and 
Hamas, which resulted in mixed electoral system. 
Mixed system in Palestine divides legislative council 
seats into two tiers; the first is 66 seats as plurality 
tier in 16 districts using “Block Vote”, and the 
second is 66 seats as proportional seats (PR). PA was 
forced to change their electoral system from Plurality 
to proportional system in order to convince Hamas to 
participate in election; especially they did not even 
think that Hamas would win. However, Fateh took 
seats nearly to Hamas in proportion tier in mixed 
system, 28 seats for Fateh , 29 For Hamas, where the 
big deviation in seats was in districts level (Plurality 
system), 17 seats for Fateh, 45 seats for Hamas 
(Bjornlund, Cowan, and William Gallery, 2007). 
 We recognized that democracy sustainability 
was collapsed in Palestine because of many reasons, 
as occupation threatened to PA after Hamas 
participation, as a leader of Palestinian government. 
In additional of that, there are many discouragement, 
social and economic conditions facing nascent 
Palestinian democracy (Cavatorta and Elgie, 2009);
. 
nevertheless, we assume that electoral system still 
play a role in democracy breakdown in Palestine, 
because it leads to cohabitation status, which it is the 
core reason in political gridlock in Palestinian 
political system.   
  
Duverger Law and electoral fractionalization: 
Duverger law has two mainly points (Duverger, 
1984): 
1- Number of competing small parties will be less 
in Majority/ Plurality election. (The  
        Psychological law on parties’ level). 
2- Voting will be less fragmented (less polarized) 
in Majority/ Plurality election in favour to big parties 
(Psychological effect on electorate). 
 According to this law, psychological and 
mechanical effect will not be occurred in majority 
system; neither proportional system (PR), it can 
occur in plurality system, where electorate do not 
want to waste their votes even to their preferences, 
when they are sure that these preferences do not have 
more chance to win any seat. On the other hand, 
parties in districts level, will not concentrate, spend 
effort and resources, because they believe that they 
have little chance to compete big parties in plurality 
system. Usually there is enough period should be 
passed until electorate and parties discover that they 
have no more chance to get seats in plurality system 
(Herron and Nishikawa, 2001). Therefore, we can 
expect, after number of elections, there will be more 
party fractionalization under PR system more than 
Majority/ Plurality system according to this law 
(Blais and Carty, 1991).  
 The mechanical effect, the other part of 
Duverger law, reflects mechanism of transforming 
votes to seats, as Blais, et al. (2011) argue.
 
Indeed, 
most of the types of votes’ calculating methods, like 
D’Hondt, Sainte-Lague are biased to big parties 
against small parties. So far, by effective number of 
electoral parties, we can compare between these 
types of methods and know how they affect number 
and seats share of parties inside parliament. This 
issue is determined by how much votes got by party 
and will be translated to seats. This leads us to find 
disproportionality percentage, as important indicator 
for extent of electoral system bias to the big parties. 
As it is known, majority/ plurality system tends to 
put obstacles toward numbers of small parties’ 
competing; in contrast, PR system allows more space 
for small parties in competing and getting seats even 
if their vote-share is small (Reynolds, Reilly, and 
Ellis, 2005). 
 It is worth drawing attention in Duverger law 
that number of seats obtained by parties in districts 
level does not just depend on their vote-share, but 
also, depends on expectation of electorate (Reynolds, 
1996). Nevertheless, these are not the only factors; 
there are other reasons, as Blaise and Carty (1991) 
argue; that part of these factors is relative to the 
number of parliament seats, district seats, ballot 
structure, synchronization with presidential election, 
and finally, the extent of federalism and political 
centralization. In this context, Norris (1997) argued 
about how district magnitude has importance to 
strategic voting; where he found that big district 
magnitude provides incentives to more players in 
election contest. He clarifies, also, that low electoral 
thresholds in each district encourage electoral player 
in seeking on individual votes (Norris, 1997). 
 There are many researches, which prove 
psychological and mechanical impact of Duverger 
law as study of Shugart (1985). Aside that, Fisher 
(1973) found in his early research, that small parties 
got numbers of votes less in district level than 
national level. In this context, Katz (as cited in Blais, 
and Carty, 1991) noticed in his study of 800 elections 
in 75 countries, that an average of parliamentary 
parties numbers in PR system was 9, single-member 
district (SMD) was 6.
 
Lijphart (1999) found an 
average of parliamentary parties was 2 in plurality, 
2.8 in majority, and 3.6 in PR. However, all of types 
of electoral system are biased to big parties; they 
give bonus of seats to big parties, but the bonus in 
plurality/majority system is more than PR system. 
Blais and Cartey (1991) confirm this relation in their 
study of 20 democracy elections. As Gunther (as 
cited in Blais, and Carty, 1991) indicated that small 
parties supporters hesitated to give their votes to their 
parties in small districts, and when threshold was 
high.   
 In contrast, Cox (1997) Criticize Duverger’s 
law, he indicated that this low could not work in all 
of circumstances. Using rational model, he explained 
his theory about the factors, which affected electorate 
strategic voting; he argued that this strategic voting 
in Duverger law context, needed particular 
circumstances, through integration between 
incentives and preferences, time factor, accurate 
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information availability about chances of party’s 
preferences and collation winning. By this view, he 
argued that voting in SMD might tend to small 
parties if one of previous factors increased (Cox, 
1997). 
 Considering Cox criticism, Moser (1991) prove 
what Cox’s finding. Aside that Moser and Scheiner 
(2004) in their study of 24-mixed electoral system in 
West Europe countries after communist, proved what 
Cox found about strategic voting. They confirmed 
the importance of providing information to electoral 
before voting, and in this relation, they found that the 
extent of institutionalized parties had important 
factor, which affected the relation between electoral 
system and number of parliamentary parties. In this 
situation, mixed electoral countries with high and 
strong institutionalized party system, electoral in it, 
will act more strategy in their voting, like Hungary 
and Lithuania, in contrast of countries, which had 
low level of institutionalized party system, like 
Russia. 
 In contrast, there are many researches could not 
prove Duverger law, as Ruiz & Rufino (n.d) studies 
of 483 parliementary elections in 71 countries 
expressed. Blais, et al. (2011) could not prove 
Duverger law in 50% of their samples. Gschwend & 
Leuffen (2005) identifies four main criteria in 
strategic voting; effectiveness, accountability, control 
and dominate, and reprehensive; they find that 
electorate is more close to more accountability and 
effectiveness; they tend to vote for united 
government, but in contrast, electorate that is more 
close to representative and control, they tend to vote 
toward divided government. In this point, previous 
researches in Duverger law, did not investigate much 
effort into mixed electoral system as in plurality 
system. The main reason for that as Herron & 
Nishikawa (2001) argued, is that recently age of most 
of democracy has adopted mixed electoral system, as 
investigating in implementing this law needs 
multiple periods of elections, providing serial of 
electoral data elections. Nevertheless, there are some 
interesting studies of mixed electoral system in this 
field. Shugart (1985) and Fisher (1973), argue that 
there is Duverger law in mixed electoral systems; 
both find that big parties have votes in district level 
more than party list level; the meaning here is that 
there is strategic voting under Duverger law. In both 
of these researches, the authors study psychological 
effect on electoral system, not on party system. In 
another side, Herron & Nishikawa (2001) find 
Mixed-Superposition, as type of mixed electoral 
system, leads to different results than PR tier and 
plurality tier. They indicate that mechanism effect on 
small parties is less than in plurality system in SMD 
level, so they recommend, taking in accounts, 
contamination has effect on both tiers of mixed 
electoral system in future studies. Even on party 
system level, they argue that small parties will 
compete in SMD contest even if they believe that 
they have little chance to win. That is why they 
consider this participation in SMD, as media 
campaign, will support them in PR contest (Herron & 
Nishikawa, 2001). 
 In contrast, Cheibub and Chernykh (2009) find 
that semi-presidential system usually adopts electoral 
system produce, which has more electoral 
fractionalization than in plurality system, so that 
reduces the chance for each party to get more than 
50% of parliamentary seats, where the potential for 
collation government will be more likely in these 
systems. 
 
Dilemma of consensus democracy under foreign 
imposed democracy countries: 
 Lijphart (1999) develops his consensus model 
through his previous theory “Consocialism”. He 
argues that consensus model can be implemented in 
divided countries and less divided countries, he says 
“The consensus model is obviously also appropriate 
for less divided but still heterogeneous countries, and 
it is a reasonable and workable alternative to the 
Westminster model even in fairly homogeneous 
countries.” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 33)  
 Lijphart (1999) identifies consensus democracy 
as alternative type of electoral democracy as it is 
famous in West democracy theory named as 
Westminster model, he believes that “Consensus 
Model” provides settled democracy without political 
violent, and with much respectful of human and 
minorities rights. This Model has mainly four based 
points according to Lijphart (1999) theory: 
1- Institutional factors are so important in 
consensus model, that they can provide strong, 
settled, and inclusive democratization to all groups of 
society. By this factor, parliamentary political system 
and proportional electoral system are the most 
favoured for consensus model. 
2- Power sharing is the main core in consensus 
model, by making grand coalition, which includes 
minority’s participation; it seems important tool for 
power sharing than exclusive authority in one party 
like Westminster model. 
3- Fedralazim is a reasonable tool to reflect 
authority concentrating; indeed, less centralization 
means more consensus democracy.  
4- Minority’s Veto, protect minorities rights from 
majorities. Indeed, this point is very complicated, 
scholars criticized Lijphart in this point, but we can 
understand Lijphart theory in minority’s veto as what 
guarantees in constitution can be given to minorities 
in order to protect their rights and their participation 
form majority. 
 Lijphart (1999) identifies 10 variables, which 
can be measured, to determine typology of political 
system as majority or consensus model. These 
variables are: 1. Concentration of executive power in 
one-party and bare -majority cabinets. 2. Cabinet 
dominance. 3. Two-party system. 4. Majoritarian and 
disproportional system of elections. 5. Interest group 
116                                                                    Ramzi Odah, et al, 2015 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 9(14) Special 2015, Pages: 113-121 
pluralism. 6. Unitary and centralized government. 7. 
Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral 
legislature. 8. Constitutional flexibility. 9. Absence 
of judicial review. 10. A central bank controlled by 
the executive. 
 Indeed, Lijphart (1999) believes that his model 
could be the suitable model for nascent democracy 
states in developed countries. When we asked him 
about possibilities for implementing this model in 
Palestine as occupied countries, he totally agrees that 
it could be. He advised us to compare consensus 
model in Palestine cases with his data base of 
consensus variable of 36 countries, which are 
included in his book ”Patterns of democracy” even if 
there are not independent countries (Lijphart, 
personal communication, March, 2015). However, 
the main point here is Lijphart’s theory focuses more 
in institutionalized and local environment factors.  
 As matter of fact, we could not take all of the 
meanings of what Lijphart advised us; because we 
still believe foreign imposed democracy has some 
particular characters. That is, we would say that 
consensus model is favoured to occupied countries, 
because occupation makes their societies more sharp 
split. The point here depends on society cleavages 
between those who believe in strong relation with 
occupier leads to independency, and between another 
who believe that resisting occupation will lead to 
independency. The result we can assume is that 
occupation will make more division in countries, so 
consensus model as Lijphart theory needs to be 
modified with three points. 
 The first modified factor is consociational model 
itself, which is the original theory of Lijphart. We 
will add favored conditions to consociational 
democracy in our model. This factor has 9 indicators; 
No majority segment, Segments equal size, Small 
number of segments, Small population size, External 
threats, Overarching loyalties, Socioeconomic 
equality, Geographical concentration, 
Accommodatory traditions (Reynolds 1996). 
 The second modified variable is president 
power; Shugart and Carey (1992) identified this 
important factor in determining democracy 
sustainability, they split this power into two powers; 
the first is legislative power that includes Package 
Veto, Partial Veto, Decree, Exclusive introduction of 
legislative, Budget power and Referenda. The second 
power is non-legislative power, which includes 
cabinet formation, Cabinet Dismissal, Assembly 
Censure, Dissolution Powers. In fact, both Shugart 
and Carey (1992) and Elgie (2008) confirm that 
semi-presidential system is more likely to breakdown 
when presidential power increases. By this point, as 
Reynolds’s previous study (1996), we will add 
president power to our model.  
 The Third modified variable is occupation 
threat, including threat to opposite parties. We will 
relay on Mathewson’s matrix for occupation threat 
(2013), in order to justify occupation-threatening 
status as high/middle/ low. However, Mathewson 
(2013) argues that occupier state can impose 
democracy in foreign states successfully if there is 
outside threat to both, occupier and occupation state; 
also, when occupier provides political and economic 
goods to the occupation state. Indeed Mathewson 
(2013) and other scholars as Enterline and Grieg 
(2008) rank the occupation conditions and 
threatening environment as important factors for 
succeeding imposed democracy. With this point, we 
will add occupation threat in our model as Figure (1). 
 
Puzzle of Palestinian legislative election 2006 
 Electoral system used in Palestine is mixed; it 
divides county in two tiers, the first is party list tier, 
has 50% of legislative council, 66 seats, chosen in 
proportion system PR in country as one district. The 
second has also 66 seats chosen in plurality system 
(First Past The Post) in 16 districts. The districts 
have different size started from SMD, like Jericho, to 
9 seats as in Hebron. However, Palestinian election 
law uses “Block Vote” method in Plurality system. 
By this method, each electorate has votes due to 
districts size; in other words, if the district size is 3, 
each electoral must give 3 votes to 3 candidates. 
Indeed Block voting has some negative points, such 
as unequal votes depend on different size of districts, 
which means that some electorate has 8 or 9 votes 
while another has 1 vote. That Lack of justice in the 
equal of votes is too obvious in district level election, 
as it is obviously a mismatch in with the population, 
as Harb (2007) argues. Besides that, Block voting 
encourages party fragmentation; so many of parties 
have more tendency to defect from the party in 
district level to nominate themselves, when they do 
not get a chance to be candidate of their party 
(Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2005). That is exactly 
what happened in Palestinian legislative election in 
2006; more than 132 candidates defected from Fateh 
party in district level (Yaghi and Fishman, 2006). In 
general, mixed electoral system has some problems 
and obstacles in democracy, as a candidates in all of 
type of plurality system almost do not need to be 
pass 50% to win; in  Palestinian legislative election 
2006; the average of votes needs to win for candidate 
is 42%, which puts question marks on democracy 
quality in that election (Shahin, 2006). 
 Most of the previous researches explain why 
Hamas got the majority of parliamentary seats 
because of Fateh split. More than 132 independent 
candidate defected from Fateh, competed against 66 
official Fateh candidates in districts level (Yaghi and 
Fishman, 2006).
 
In whole view, more than 400 
independent candidates including Fateh and Hamas 
candidates competed in districts level.  The 
Independent candidates took more than 20% of vote 
share in district level (Shikaki and Harb, 2007, 
p.326). Fateh was exhausted from them more than 
Hamas, in most of district level (Fruitesandvotes ,nd 
). In opposite, Hamas members have more 
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commitment to their party in election as Carey and 
Reynolds (2011) argue; they explain why Fateh party 
had weak understanding to deal with “Block Vote” 
system, and Fateh nominated numbers of candidates 
in each district more than its electoral capacity, 
Contrary to what it requires to the Block system. 
They say in this point: 
 Success in the Block Vote requires restraint. It 
requires that a party should field no more candidates 
in a district than can be realistically expected to win, 
and that the party’s supporters must shun all ticket-
splitting and stick exclusively with their “own” 
candidates. Reforms in 2006 established a parallel 
system that featured 66 list-PR seats alongside 66 
BV seats. This time, Fatah faced a much more 
serious challenge from the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas), which had developed powerful 
grassroots networks and proved to be much more 
adept in the BV contests. Hamas won 44 percent of 
the overall vote but took 68 percent of all BV seats, 
enough to give it a 57 percent majority on the PLC. 
(Carey and Reynolds,
 
 2011, p.43-44) 
 In contrast of previous studies, Kokkali (2006) 
explained how Fateh lost the last election by 
changing supporters of small parties their votes from 
their preferences to Hamas, because they recognizes 
that their small parties has logical ability to win in 
district level. He argues that there is strategic voting, 
as he says: 
 Electoral tend to give their votes against Fateh 
,favor to Hamas instead of giving their votes to small 
parties, as they believe that this small parties cannot 
make main changes in parties representatives in 
parliament ,this what happened exactly to Badel list 
and  Third way list.(Kokkali
 
, 2006, ¶  6 ) 
 Indeed, we have two mainly comments about all 
of previous studies we mentioned; the first is the 
effect of independent candidate on district level. 
Indeed, we can recognize this effect of independent 
candidate, especially for Fateh party when they had 
big fragmentation as previous studies indicated. 
Although, we have to say that they were also 
independent candidates from Hamas. In this view, it 
is not fair to say that Fateh lost district election 
because of 132 defected candidate from Fateh. 
Firstly, we have to calculate how many independent 
candidates defected from Hamas parties. Secondly, 
we need to know how much the extent of 
strengthening of 132 independent candidate in Fateh 
parties, in order to determine how much they affected 
ticket splitting from Fateh supporters by their 
nomination in district level. In other worlds, how 
much they took vote share form their original party; 
Fateh then lead to split Fateh supporter’s electoral 
votes, which led to loss official Fateh candidates in 
this contest. 
 The second comment about previous studies is 
that most of previous researches –except Kokkaki 
(2006) article - concentrate in their analysis in Fateh 
cleavage, but they do not consider Duverger law. 
Even Kokkali (2006) mentions his idea without any 
proof. We believe that even if Fateh has weakness in 
district election because of numbers of defected 
candidates, but also there many votes are obtained by 
small parties supporters, so may be these votes can 
offset vote share taken by independent candidates, 
However that result needs to be discussed through 
investigating in the extent of implementing Duverger 
law.  
 In investigating the result of Palestinian election 
in 2006, we have two important comments that could 
explain why Hamas won majority of parliamentary 
seats; First comment is concerned with Duverger 
law. We could not observe any impact of 
physiological effects on electorate in district level, 
and that factor may be explained why Hamas won 
the majority of seats. In this point, we review some 
samples of previous studies in mixed electoral 
system, as Moser & Scheiner (2009); they calculate 
the average of disproportionality (Lsq) of 24 mixed 
elections, which is equal to 8.11, where it is 10 in 
Palestinian legislative election 2006.  They also 
calculate the average of number of electoral parties 
(ENPP) is equal to 3.93, where it is too low in our 
case, about 2.32. Indeed this low rate for ENPP is 
close to plurality system more than mixed system as 
Lijphart’s (1999) findings. However, Moser and 
Scheiner (2009) find the average of votes obtained 
by big parties in party list tier is less than plurality 
tier; that is close to Duverger law impact. In contrast, 
Palestinian election case study, where seats sharing 
existed for Hamas, Fateh in PR tier was 44%, 42.5% 
descriptive, while the same share in district level is 
68%, 25.75% descriptive. If we look at vote share, 
we will find no effect of Duverger law obviously. 
Hamas, Fateh get vote share in PR tier as 44%, 41% 
descriptive , while they get in district level vote share 
as 41%, 34% descriptive. By mathematical way, we 
can confirm that both Fateh and Hamas lose votes in 
district level, in contrast to Duverger law. Hamas lost 
3% in votes but, because of impact of mechanical 
factor of Duverger law, it got 68% of seats, in 
contrast, Fateh lost 7% of votes, while it got just 
25.75% of seats. 
 Second comment relatives to low rate of 
electoral fractionalization under second Palestinian 
legislative election, which it is in contrast of general 
theory of election. This could be explained why 
Hamas won majority seats.   Elgie and McMenamin 
(2011) identify cohabitation that it is less likely to 
occur where there are much or small numbers of 
parties in parliament. Actually, this assumption is 
more general and it is not clear enough. We 
investigate 44 cases in Elgie’s research, and we find 
most cases of cohabitation occurred in PR system (37 
cases), 4 cases in mixed electoral system, in France, 
Lithuania, three cases in in plurality/ majority system 
in Mongolia. That leads us to result that there is a 
probability relation between PR system and 
cohabitation. As cohabitation’s cases in Elgie and 
McMenamin’s studies (2011), we calculate the 
average of disproportionality of these cases is 6.54, 
ENPP is 4.5, and effective number of parliamentary 
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parties is 3.42. As we can see, these rates are almost 
near to average rate in parliamentary system, which 
use PR.  
 However if that is true, it does not match with 
Elgie and McMenamin’s assumption; that 
cohabitation is less likely to occur when number of 
parties is high or low. Our point is that in PR system 
number of parties is almost high, as previous studies 
finds (Lijphart 1999), so why did most of cases of 
cohabitation occur in PR system in contrast of Elgie 
and McMenamin’s assumption. Indeed this issue 
needs more researches; especially that most of semi-
presidential systems have PR system rather than 
Plurality or mixed electoral system, so it is normal to 
find that most cohabitation occurs in PR system.  
 The main point from previous analysis is 
electoral fragmentation. While this rate is low level, 
like in Plurality system, the chance for each party to 
get 50% is more likely, so cohabitation will be more 
likely to occur. That is said, cohabitation in 
Palestinian occurred because ENPP is low, 2.32. 
While small numbers of parties cannot get any seats 
especially in district level as it appears in Table (1), 
chances for both big parties to get all of the votes 
will be increased as Duverger law. In this point, we 
can argue that because of Duverger law exists in 
mixed electoral system, effective number of 
parliamentary parties is reduced, and that means 
more polarization to the big parties, so cohabitation 
will be more likely to occur upon to Duverger law. 
 By comparing results of Palestinian case study 
with Moser and Scheiner
 
(2004) study and Birch 
(2000), as Table (1) we can easily notice ENPP in 
our case is less than ENPP in cohabitation periods 
findings in Elgie and McMenamin’s study (2011), or 
in Moser and Scheiner (2009) study which is equal to 
5.64. This confirms our result that mixed electoral 
system in Palestine produces party system close to 
plurality system. As Birch (2000) findings, we notice 
Physiological effect clearly, because the average of  
vote sharing for big party in district level reaches to 
50% , but the same average in PR list is more less 
than it, which is  41%. In Palestine case, most of 
seats were divided between Hamas and Fateh, (Just 
four seats to independent candidates), and both 
parties took less votes in district level rather than 
party list level, in contrast with Birch previous study.  
 Indeed, there are few Probabilities that may help 
to explain this complicated theoretical dilemma: 
1- Supporters’ electorate of small parties gave their 
votes to their preferences in district level without any 
consideration to Duverger law. 
2- Supporters’ electorate of small parties gave their 
votes to both Hamas and Fateh, but they gave Hamas 
more than Fateh because of their position against 
Oslo. 
3- Supporters’ electorate of both big parties gave 
some of their votes to independent candidates 
depends on family relations, which lead to lose both 
Fateh and Hamas some percentage of their votes in 
district level. 
 We will delete the first likelihood; that is why; 
many of small parties did not nominate any candidate 
in district level, because of physiological impact on 
party level (Third party has 1 candidate in district 
level. Abu Ali Mustafa list has 24 candidates, and Al 
Badeal has 6 in district level (Shikaki and Harb, 
2007, 302-341) ). Through this analysis, our model 
just concentrates on testing the second and third 
Probability, which means that there will be more 
likelihood to vote strategically toward opposite party 
from small party’s supporters, with more likelihood 
of number of votes goes to independent candidates. 
The likelihood of both has the opposite of the results; 
the difference between the impacts of them 
represents the result in strategically voting attitudes. 
 
Table 1:  







parties in party 
list level 
First big party 
















8.11 5.09 UN UN UN UN UN UN 




10 2.68 2 6 68 44 25.75 42.5 
D1 
 
1.89 -2.41 UN UN UN UN UN UN 
D2 UN -2.42 -4.08 -4.46  26.54 0.84 UN UN 
 
Resources:  
 UN; means data not available. Recourses: Moser 
and Ethan Scheiner (2004). Sara study data, from 
Birch (2000)  
 D1=Palestinian election indicator minus Moser 
indicator, D2=Palestinian election indicator minus 
Sara indicator 
 Data resourses about second Palestinian election 
from: Gallagher (2013)  
 Big party vote share in Palestenian election data 
from (Shikaki and Harb 2007,302-341)  
 
New model of cohabitation in foreign imposed 
democracy countries: 
 Our new model in Figure (1) has two tied parts; 
the first part investigates the relation between mixed 
electoral system and the likelihood of cohabitation by 
increasing the opposing parties’ chance to get more 
50% of parliamentary seats. The second part 
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investigates the relation between cohabitation and 
collapse of democracy sustainability. The main factor 
who matches between both parts is divided society 






  The idea is that, within foreign imposed 
democracy countries, there will be two divided main 
parts in society, the first one is usually the authority 
representative, which has strong relation with 
occupation; the second part is against any relation 
with occupation, because it focuses to get 
independency, which will not be done through 
relation with occupation. Most social and political 
movements and parties in society are divided into 
these two parts; this division will be sharper when it 
is combined with culture and Ideology division. In 
our case we face very complicated divided countries, 
in which the people shape their attitudes socially and 
politically according to this sharp division in divided 
country, as Lijphart (1999) identified conceptual of 
divided countries. 
 The point here is that electorate will give their 
votes upon this division according to consociational 
democracy theory (Lijphart, 1999; Reynolds, 1996).  
Indeed this is the same perception of division status 
in Palestinian society; there are two parts, the first is 
religious, led by Hamas, refused Oslo agreement. 
The second is the secular part led by Fateh, agree 
with Oslo. We assume, through our model, because 
of high sharp division, according to Duverger law, 
that the voters, as supporters of small parties, give 
their votes to Hamas instead of Fateh in district level 
because of many of small parties have negative 
perception towards Oslo. In this view we can assume 
that mixed electoral system is more likely to occur 
cohabitation in divided society, like occupied 
countries, where there will be more polarization (less 
fragmentation) to big opposite party according to this 
division, which increases the likelihood of opposite 
party to get more than 50% from parliamentary seats. 
 This model explains the factors, which affect 
cohabitation in semi-presidential system, we assume 
here that cohabitation is more likely to collapse 
democracy in foreign imposed democracy countries 
if one of these following factors increase; 
1- Majority typology of semi-presidential system. 
2- Un-Favor conditions to consociational 
democracy 
3- Power of President. 
4- Occupation threaten, including threaten to 
opposing parties.  
 
Conclusion and future studies: 
 This paper analyses the relationship between 
mixed electoral system and sustainable democracy, 
through cohabitation, as intervening variable. From 
our discussion, we find mixed electoral system 
encourages likelihood of cohabitation in foreign-
imposed democracy, having two effects. The first 
one is the effect of plurality tier, which encourages 
more independent candidates to nominate themselves 
in district level, and even more, it encourages more 
split in party system as we can easily notice from 
Palestinian legislative election in 2006, particularly 
in Fateh case. This case affects more polarization to 
one of the both big parties, which increases the 
likelihood of cohabitation. The second effect of 
mixed electoral system is polarization toward big 
parties that depend on cleavage in society, according 
to group’s perception toward occupation. With sharp 
split in society, accommodated with ideological split, 
we can expect more polarization to the opposite big 
party against Party of president that will lead to more 
likelihood of cohabitation.  
 By Our research, we find interesting result in 
studding Duverger law. In mixed electoral system, 
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we need more investigation to analyze whether there 
is strategically voting or not. This analysis depends 
on checking voting forward independent candidates 
and/or from small party’s supporters. This procedure 
is not easy to follow up, but we find it is so earlier 
for scholar to confirm that there is no strategic voting 
in Palestinian election according to both Fateh and 
Hamas took lees votes in district level than PR tier. 
We recommend scholars to study both of votes’ 
direction to independent candidate, and votes’ 
direction from small party’s supporters in district 
level. That analysis will be so useful when scholars 
need to answer why Hamas won majority seats in 
legislative council. 
 The second important part in our model is 
consensus model, and we rely on Lijphart model in 
order to explain why cohabitation in nascent foreign 
imposed democracy countries is more likely to 
breakdown. Our model suggests consensus model 
(Typology of political system), consociationalism 
favored factors, President power, and occupation 
threat; as factors affect democracy sustainability in 
FIDC. That model recommend that democracy will 
be more sustained in FIDC, when  Consocialism is 
achieved in political arena, not just reconciliation. By 
this model, we can predict whether cohabitation 
status of democracy will be survived or not. We can 
recommend that this model is suitable also for new 
democracy, not just foreign imposed democracy. 
That recommendation will be one of the important 
recommendations for future studies to test this model 
in cohabitation periods in different countries with 
deleting occupation threat in this model, and that 
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